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CONFUSION AMONG THE COURTS:
SHOULD THE CONTENTS OF PERSONAL
PAPERS BE PRIVILEGED BY THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT'S SELF-INCRIMINATION
CLAUSE?
The Fifth Amendment' of the United States Constitution pro-
vides individuals with protection against compelled self-incrimi-
nation.2 Traditionally, this protection was applied to oral testi-
mony.3 However in 1886, the Supreme Court extended Fifth
Amendment protection to documents in Boyd v. United States.4
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part: "No person
shall be... compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness against himself..." Id.2 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976). "We adhere to the view that the
Fifth Amendment protects against 'compelled self-incrimination.'" Id.; Bellis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974). "[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and
effects as well as compelled oral testimony." Id.; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965). "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create
a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment." Id.;
LEONARD W. LEvy, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMI-
NATION 432 (1968). Mr. Levy states:
The framers of the Bill of Rights saw their injunction, that no man should be a witness
against himself in a criminal case, as a central feature of the accusatory system of
criminal justice. While deeply committed to perpetuating a system that minimized the
possibilities of convicting the innocent, they were not less concerned about the human-
ity that the fundamental law should show even to the offender. Above all, the Fifth
Amendment reflected their judgment that in a free society, based on respect for the
individual, the determination of guilt or innocence by just procedures, in which the
accused made no unwilling contribution to his conviction, was more important than
punishing the guilty.
Id.; see also Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
48 U. PITT. L. REv. 27, 36 (1986). "The Fifth Amendment is... much narrower, applying
only to compelled self-incrimination. Nevertheless, within this limited sphere its prohibi-
tion is absolute. It does not merely regulate procedures, and it forbids any force or compul-
sion for the purpose of extracting self-incrimination." Id.
3 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 415. The Court noted that historically, the privilege against
self-incrimination has been applied by the courts to avoid compelling one to disclose the
contents of one's mind or private-written thoughts. Id.; Robert Heidt, The Fifth Amendment
Privilege and Documents-Cutting Fisher's Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. REv. 439, 460 (1984).
"Consider the application of the privilege to testimony. There the application of the privi-
lege turns solely on whether the testimony is incriminating. If the information sought is
incriminating, the privilege affords complete protection; if not, it offers no protection." Id.;
Kevin Urick, Note, The Right Against Self-Incrimination in Early American Law, 20
COLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 107, 125 (1988). "[T]he state common law decisions... routinely
excluded compelled testimony, whether obtained by state officers or private individuals."
Id.
4 116 U.S. 616 (1886). "[A] compulsory production of the private books and papers of the
owners of the goods... is compelling him to be a witness against himself...." Id. at 634-
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The Boyd Court articulated a contents-based privilege which de-
nied disclosure of the contents of one's personal papers.5 The deci-
sion in Boyd relied on the notion that the private property rights
of an individual were superior to the government's interest in ac-
quiring evidence in a criminal investigation. Although Boyd has
been interpreted as a protector of privacy, the language in the de-
cision that focused on the nature of private papers,7 was merely
dicta.8 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has relied on the dicta in
Boyd for ninety years. 9
35; see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 471-72 (1976) (discussing Boyd's extension of
self-incrimination privilege to documents); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944)
(stating that Fifth Amendment prevents use of legal process to force accused to incriminate
himself either through compelled testimony or compelled production of private documents);
United States v. Doe, 1 F.3d 87, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing Doe's reliance on the lan-
guage contained in Boyd), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1993) (No.
93-523); Alito, supra note 2, at 27-35 (examining extension of privilege against self-incrimi-
nation to documents as seen in Boyd); Barbara Daniels Davis, Note, The Fifth Amendment
and Production of Documents After United States v. Doe, 66 B.U. L. REV. 95, 99-101 (1986)
(analyzing impact of Boyd on subsequent cases); Urick, supra note 3, at 126 (indicating
that Boyd was extension of privilege against self-incrimination).
5 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622-24 (standing for proposition that contents of one's papers are
privileged); 1 RICHARD J. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 127, at 464 (4th ed.
1992). "The conceptual basis for [Boyd's protection of the contents of private papers] was
never entirely clear, but seemed to rest upon the combined effect of the Fifth Amendment's
privilege and the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures." Id.; Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self-Incrimination and Private Pa-
pers in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REV. 343, 344 (1979). "Under [Boyd's] influence, the
sharp outlines of the Fifth Amendment were overlain with an undifferentiated concern for
allowing people to maintain the privacy of all of their papers and effects." Id.; see also infra
notes 30-36 and accompanying text (analyzing Boyd decision and its ramifications).
6 See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (analyzing Boyd Court's reliance on pri-
vate-property rationale).
7 See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (discussing privacy rationale behind
Boyd).
8 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976). "The pronouncement in Boyd
that a person may not be forced to produce his papers has nonetheless often appeared as
dictum in later opinions of this Court." Id.; Doe, 1 F.3d at 91 (repeating language in Fisher
referring to dicta in Boyd).
9 See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974). The Bellis Court stated that while
contents of private papers are privileged, the privilege does not extend to compelled produc-
tion of partnership records. Id.; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974) (hold-
ing that grand jury may not compel person to produce incriminating books and papers);
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330 (1973) (holding that because individual in ques-
tion did not personally own documents in question, Boyd doctrine did not apply); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263, 266 (1967) (holding that self-incrimination privilege applies only
to compelled production of accused's communications including papers); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221 (1967) (stating that self-incrimination privilege protects accused
from being compelled to produce incriminating evidence); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582, 587-88 (1946) (focusing on Boyd's role in protecting accused from compelled production
of incriminating evidence); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944) (reflecting
view that only person entitled to claim privilege is owner of documents subpoenaed);
Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489 (1913) (holding that corporate officer could not
invoke privilege because subpoenaed books were not his private property); Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361, 375 (1911) (stating that Boyd applies to compelled production of pri-
19931 CONFUSION AMONG THE COURTS
Beginning with Fisher v. United States,'° the Supreme Court
articulated an alternative analysis to the contents-based privilege
for determining whether documents were privileged. 1 This ap-
proach, rather than focusing on the contents of the documents, as
in Boyd, analyzed whether the act of producing the document trig-
gered Fifth Amendment protection.' 2
In recent years, the Supreme Court has concentrated on the act
of production analysis. 3 This emphasis on the act of production
analysis has caused lower courts to question the validity of the
contents-based privilege.' 4 As a result of the Supreme Court's fail-
vate documents, not business records); ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 45 (1904) (stressing Jus-
tice Bradley's analysis in Boyd of overlap of Fourth and Fifth Amendments with respect to
production of documents); see also Alito, supra note 2, at 29 (stating that Boyd doctrine
upheld for over 90 years); Davis, supra note 4, at 101 (tracing history of Boyd).
10 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
11 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409. The Court explained:
The foundations for the rule [against compelling production of private papers] have
been washed away. In consequence, the prohibition against forcing the production of
private papers has long been a rule searching for a rationale consistent with the pro-
scription of Fifth Amendment against compelling a person to give "testimony" that
incriminates himself. Accordingly, we turn to the question of what if any, incriminat-
ing testimony within the Fifth Amendment's protection, is compelled by a documen-
tary summons.
Id.; see also United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1984) (describing new approach
articulated in Fisher); Alito, supra note 2, at 41-51 (analyzing Fisher decision and its im-
pact); Robert B. Foster, Comment, The Right Against Self-Incrimination by Producing Doc-
uments: Rethinking the Representative Capacity Doctrine, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1605, 1614-18
(1986) (examining importance of Fisher decision and its effect on self-incrimination).
12 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 391 (creating new analysis for determining whether production of
documents is privileged); McCoRMICK, supra note 5, § 126, at 307. "By producing certain
items, the respondent communicates at least the following information: (a) the items pro-
duced exist; (b) the items were within the possession or control of the respondent; and (c)
the respondent believes or has some reason to believe that the items produced are those
described in the subpoena." Id.; see infra notes 48-65 and accompanying text (analyzing
application of act-of-production privilege for documents).
13 See Doe, 465 U.S. at 612 (reaffirming Fisher's act-of-production analysis); Andresen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473-74 (1976). "The Fifth Amendment may protect an individual
from complying with a subpoena for the production of his personal records in his possession
because the very act of production may constitute a compulsory authentication of incrimi-
nating evidence. .. ."Id.; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (establishing new act-of-production analy-
sis for determining whether self-incrimination privilege can be properly invoked); Alito,
supra note 2, at 41-51 (distinguishing act of production analysis from contents-based ap-
proach); Davis, supra note 4, at 105-10 (focusing on impact of Fisher on compelled produc-
tion of papers); Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum:
The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 Hxv. L. REV. 683, 683 (1982) [hereinafter
Aftermath of Fisher]. "Lower courts must recognize that Fisher v. United States and other
recent Supreme Court decisions represent a fundamental shift in Fifth Amendment juris-
prudence from a concern with privacy to a focus on compulsion." Id.
14 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 407 (questioning validity of Boyd); United States v. Doe, 1 F.3d
87, 91 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that continuing validity of Boyd questionable after Supreme
Court's decisions in Fisher and Doe), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Oct. 4,
1993) (No. 93-523); Aftermath of Fisher, supra note 13, at 685. "[Blecause Fisher explicitly
did not decide whether Boyd's protection of private papers is still required by the Fifth
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ure to clarify the law regarding Fifth Amendment protection of
private documents, circuit courts have applied the self-incrimina-
tion privilege inconsistently. 15 A need has therefore arisen for the
Supreme Court to clearly state whether a contents-based privilege
exists today.
Part One of this Note focuses on the history of the Fifth Amend-
ment and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the self-incrimi-
nation clause. Part Two examines the nature of the contents-
based privilege, as opposed to the act of production privilege. Part
Three illustrates the confusion among the circuit courts as to
whether a contents-based privilege still exists. Finally, Part Four
analyzes the New York courts' interpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege based on the holdings in Fisher v. United States 6
and United States v. Doe.17
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
The people of the United States are protected against compelled
self-incrimination by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.'"
However, the history of this privilege has much deeper roots. 9
The self-incrimination privilege as it exists in the United States,
Amendment, defendants may argue that Boyd continues to protect their private papers."
Id.
15 See infra notes 73-126 and accompanying text (examining alternative approaches
used by circuit courts).
16 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
17 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
18 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing self-in-
crimination privilege as applied to oral testimony).
19 See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470 (1976). The Supreme Court noted that
'the development of this protection was in part a response to certain historical practices,
such as ecclesiastical inquisitions and the proceedings of the Star Chamber . . . ." Id.; see
also R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the
European Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 964 (1990). "[The] twin sources of Euro-
pean law were joined together in most aspects of legal practice in continental countries and
were known as the ius commune .... The ius commune itself contained a rule against
forced self-incrimination . . . ." Id. The English common-law privilege against self-incrimi-
nation can be traced back to the Roman canon law and the European ius commune, or
common law. Id. at 964-87. The author focused European law as the birthplace of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Id. Davis, supra note 4, at 97; Urick, supra note 3, at 108-
15 (tracing history of American protection against self-incrimination to its English roots in
common-law system). The Jewish Talmud provided that incriminating statements made by
an accused could not be used against the accused in a criminal trial, even if the statements
were voluntarily made. Id. See generally LEVY, supra note 2, at 433-35. The author traces
the development of the self-incrimination privilege from its Talmudic origins through Eng-
lish common law and into the 18th century in the United States Constitution. Id.
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can be traced to English common law.2" In England, the historical
basis for the privilege began with a movement against the inquisi-
tional system of law, used by the ecclesiastical courts, in which the
accused had no right against self-incrimination. 2 ' In contrast, the
English common-law courts used an accusatorial system which
upheld the right of an accused to face his accusers and maintain
his innocence.22 In the fourteenth century, the King's courts began
to use the inquisitional approach, while the English common-law
courts continued to use the accusatorial approach. 23 The conflict
between the inquisitional approach and the accusatorial approach
was not resolved until the mid-seventeenth century, when the
right against self-incrimination was recognized.24 Although the
20 See Urick, supra note 3, at 108-09. The English common-law system has its roots in
Germanic law which was brought to England by the Saxons when they defeated the Celts.
Id.; see also infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text (discussing history of privilege
against self-incrimination as it developed in England).
21 See Helmholz, supra note 19, at 964-67. The English ecclesiastical courts used the ex
officio oath which required the accused to answer truthfully all questions asked of him or
her. Id. The ecclesiastical or church courts were concerned with the punishment of heretics,
and the accused were afforded no rights to confront their accusers. Id. "Since defendants in
criminal cases did not necessarily know precisely what the questions would be at the time
they took the oath, this common practice resulted in their swearing to give evidence against
themselves." Id. at 965; Urick, supra note 3, at 110. The inquisitional system was used by
the church courts. Id. Criminal cases in the church courts used the ex officio oath and the
accused was not allowed to know the accusation or the identity of the witnesses against
him. Id. Torture was the ecclesiastical courts' favored means of forcing individuals into
incriminating themselves. Id. at 110-11. The ex officio oaths provided a forceful method for
suppressing heresy where the crime was the accused's belief. Id. See generally LEVY, supra
note 2, at 432 passim (providing in-depth analysis of inquisitional approach used by church
courts).
22 See Helmholz, supra note 19, at 963. "[T]he English common law.., upheld, with only
occasional backsliding, the rights and liberties of the subject. The traditions and practition-
ers of the common law forged the right not to be compelled to answer incriminating ques-
tions." Id. (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 216-18 (2d ed.
1986)); Urick, supra note 3, at 109. "Individuals levied charges against others by making a
proper accusation, for which there were formal rules to satisfy before the accused was re-
quired to answer." Id. (citing LEVY, supra, at 2-42).
23 See Urick, supra note 3, at 111. "While the English common law courts maintained
accusatorial procedures, gradually both King's Council and Chancery adopted procedures
similar to those in the ecclesiastical courts ... King's Council and Chancery subjected the
accused to interrogatory examinations." Id. In 1368, Edward III outlawed the use of inqui-
sitional procedures by the ecclesiastical courts, however, in 1400, Henry IV provided the
church courts greater authority. Id. There remained great dissent over the power of the
church courts to use inquisitional procedures. Id.
24 See Helmholz, supra note 19, at 964-65. "[T]he first unequivocal expressions of the
privilege against the self-incrimination occurred during the constitutional struggles of the
seventeenth century, specifically in the dispute over the legality of the ex officio oath used
by the English ecclesiastical courts." Id. (citing 8 JOnN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIS AT
COMMON LAw § 2250, at 270-284 (1st ed. 1904)); Urick, supra note 3, at 108. The right
against self-incrimination was born during the period when the modern, centralized state
developed. Id. During the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, the Court of High Commission and
the Court of Star Chamber were created to suppress heresy. Id. at 112 n.21.
224 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY -[Vol. 9:219
privilege was originally a "right of silence,"25 which only protected
speech, in the early eighteenth century, the English courts ex-
tended the privilege to documents.26
The evolution of the English right against self-incrimination
was evident in the early history of American jurisprudence.
Prior to the enactment of the Bill of Rights, several state constitu-
tions protected the right to be free from incriminating oneself.
28
Moreover, when the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were writ-
ten, the right against self-incrimination was incorporated as a
fundamental right to be extended to all persons in the United
States.2 s
It was during the trial of John Lilburne that the common-law right against self-incrimi-
nation was asserted in the Court of Star Chamber. Id. at 114. "The spark that ignited the
popular outrage was the trial of John Lilburne, an anti-Stuart Leveller known as Freeborn
John." Id. John Lilburne refused in two trials to answer questions placed before him by the
Court of Star Chamber, and he "refused to take the oath in the Court of Star Chamber and
is generally credited with having provided the strongest impetus to the affirmation of the
right against self-incrimination." Id. (citing Lilburne's Trial, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315, 1320,
1330-37, 1353-54 (1637); M.A. GIBB, JOHN LILBURNE THE LEVELLER: A CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT
(1947). Lilburne's trial occurred in 1637 and between 1660 and 1680, the right against self-
incrimination was firmly established. Id. at 115; see also Davis, supra note 4, at 97-98. "The
English version of the privilege surfaced in the seventeenth century in response to the
tactics of the prerogative courts, which inquired in political and religious crimes ...
Lilburne's refusal almost cost him his life, but generated enough publicity to cause Parlia-
ment to abolish both the Star Chamber Court and the prerogative oaths. By the early
1650s, the privilege was cemented in English common law." Id.
25 See LEVY, supra note 2, at 390; supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing self-
incrimination privilege as applied to oral testimony).
26 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 418 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). "Be-
ginning in the early eighteenth century the English courts widened that right to include
protection against the necessity of producing books and documents that might tend to in-
criminate the accused .... " Id.; see also Davis, supra note 4, at 99 (discussing England's
broadening of privilege against self-incrimination to encompass documents).
27 See Urick, supra note 3, at 115. The Puritans were strong advocates of the right
against self-incrimination in England. Id. When they began to migrate to the colonies, they
continued to fight for this right because they continued to face religious intolerance. Id.
28 Id. at 116. "As the colonies acquired statehood and adopted constitutions and bills of
rights, many states enacted constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right against self-
incrimination." Id. (citing R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 764-65 (1935));
Davis, supra note 4, at 98. "Upon declaring independence from England, several states
incorporated the common law privilege into their state constitutions." Id. (citing LEVY,
supra note 2, at 405).
29 See Davis, supra note 4, at 98-99. "Thus the Framers of the Constitution decided to
uphold human dignity by establishing a system of justice that did not require the accused
to contribute to his own criminal conviction." Id. (citing LEVY, supra note 2, at 432); Urick,
supra note 3, at 116. "The persons who promulgated the Fifth Amendment understood that
the right against self-incrimination which the Fifth Amendment was to guarantee would
assume the same attributes with which common law courts, in England and in America,
had invested that right." Id..
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTENTS-BASED PRIVILEGE AND
THE ACT OF PRODUCTION ANALYSIS
A. Boyd v. United States
In Boyd v. United States,30 the Supreme Court first addressed
the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination
protection applied to the production of documents requested in a
subpoena.3 1 In Boyd, the government subpoenaed a firm's invoices
for shipments of glass into the United States.32 The firm complied
with the subpoena under protest, and certain quantities of the
glass were forfeited for tariff violations. 33 The Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the trial court on the grounds that the com-
pelled production of the documents violated the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.34 Justice Joseph Bradley, writing for the majority,
stated that forcing the firm to produce the documents in question
was analogous to a search and seizure. Therefore, since the gov-
ernment's rights to the documents were not superior to the rights
of the firm, the seizure was unconstitutional .3  The Court stated
30 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
3' See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 471 (1976). "Thus, in Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886), the Court stated: '[W]e have been unable to perceive that the
seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substan-
tially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself.'" Id.; Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 405 (1976). "The proposition that the Fifth Amendment prevents com-
pelled production of documents over objection that such production might incriminate
stems from Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)." Id.; Alito, supra note 2, at 31. "The
Supreme Court's efforts to explain how the privilege against compelled self-incrimination
applies to subpoenas for documents began a century ago with Boyd v. United States, in
which the Court held that an individual's private papers were absolutely protected." Id.;
Urick, supra note 3, at 126. "In Boyd v. United States, the Supreme Court seems to have
adopted the rule that the right.., affords some protection when documentary evidence and
the writings of the accused are sought." Id.; see also Davis, supra note 4, at 100-01 (stating
that contents-based approach established in Boyd was followed by Supreme Court for
ninety years).
32 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 618; Foster, supra note 11, at 1608. "At trial, the quantity and
value of a previous glass shipment became important, and the government secured a court
order directing the Boyds to produce an invoice for the earlier shipment." Id. (citing Boyd,
116 U.S. at 618).
33 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 618.
34 Id. at 630; see Foster, supra note 11, at 1608. "In Boyd, Justice Bradley stressed the
need to construe liberally constitutional provisions intended to protect people and property;
in so doing, he made the protections provided by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments over-
lap." Id.
35 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622; see Alito, supra note 2, at 34. Justice Bradley concluded that
the subpoena was the equivalent of a search and seizure and because the government's
interest in the papers was not superior to the interest of the private party, the search was
unconstitutional. Id.; Mitchell L. Rothman, Life After Doe? Self-Incrimination and Business
Documents, 56 U. CiNN. L. REv. 387, 391-92 (1987). The author noted:
In today's terms, however, no search or seizure occurred; the trial court's order de-
manding the invoice was the functional equivalent of a subpoena duces tecum requir-
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that compelling an individual to produce private papers was a
violation of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination. 6
Although the Court's argument was founded upon a private
property rationale,"7 Boyd has since been viewed as a case espous-
ing general privacy rights.3 8 The privacy rationale is based on the
ing production of business documents for preliminary investigation or proof at trial.
When seen in this light, Boyd is not really a Fourth Amendment case at all; it is a Fifth
Amendment opinion. It is important, therefore, to consider what Boyd actually says
about the Fifth Amendment.
Id.
36 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35. "[A] compulsory production of the private books and papers
of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited.., is compelling him to be a witness against
himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution." Id.
37 See id. at 622-34. The Court distinguished between the government's seizure of pri-
vate goods and its seizure of stolen goods. Id. In seizing stolen goods, the government was
justified because the interest of the rightful owner is superior to that of the wrongful pos-
sessor. Id. The Court explained that this was unlike the situation where the government
seized an individual's private papers. Id.; Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law:
Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 VA. L. REV. 1, 52 (1987). The Court based its
decision not on general principles of privacy, but on a concept of private property which was
fundamental to the age during which Boyd was decided. Id.; Shauna J. Sullivan, Comment,
Fifth Amendment Protection and the Production of Corporate Documents, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 747, 750 (1987).
In Boyd, the Supreme Court based its analysis on a property theory. The Court found
that business records could not be subpoenaed because they were the owner's private
papers. The Court held that whenever a subpoena requires the production of a person's
private property for use against him in a criminal cases, the Fifth Amendment is vio-
lated. The content rule articulated in Boyd reflected a desire to protect privacy.
Id.; Note, Organizational Papers and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 640, 643 (1986). "As the language of Boyd and White suggests, the protection of docu-
ments under the privacy rubric was initially animated by the desire to preserve common
law property rights. Property rights . . . are deserving of the highest protection; indeed,
those rights are nothing less than sacred." Id.
38 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976). "It is true that the Court has
often stated that one of the several purposes served by the constitutional privilege against
compelled testimonial self-incrimination is that of protecting personal privacy." Id. "Protec-
tion of personal privacy is a central purpose of the privilege against compelled self-incrimi-
nation." Id. at 416 (Brennan, J., concurring); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327
(1973). "It respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and pros-
cribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation." Id.; Murphy v. Waterfront Commis-
sion, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). The Fifth Amendment reflects an interest in protecting one's
right to live a private life. Id.; Heidt, supra note 3, at 460. "An apparent goal of the privacy
rationale, therefore, was to allow a person to write his thoughts and feelings without fear of
the writing returning to haunt him." Id.; Mosteller, supra note 37, at 51. "Boyd is now
considered the bulwark of privacy...." Id.; Rothman, supra note 35, at 393. "[I]t is clear to
one who reads Boyd today that, while the Court's arguments were couched in property law
terms, the decision's basic concern was privacy; the Court thought it essential to draw a
barrier around the individual beyond which the state could not go." Id.; William J. Stuntz,
Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1232-36 (1988) (discussing use of
self-incrimination privilege as protector of privacy); Foster, supra note 11, at 1610 (analyz-
ing Boyd's concern with privacy interests). But see Fisher, 425 U.S. at 399. "(T]he court has
never suggested that every invasion of privacy violates the privilege." Id.
The development of Boyd's privacy rationale is evident in the collective entities exception
to the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944). "The papers
and effects which the privilege protects must be the private property of the person claiming
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premise that one's written thoughts are closely connected to the
person.3 9 These personal-written thoughts are no different than
what a person may orally divulge.40 Written thoughts are an ex-
tension of the person, and reflect his or her innermost thoughts.4 '
Without Fifth Amendment protection over the contents of per-
sonal papers, individuals would be discouraged from writing down
their ideas, fearing that their thoughts might be self-incriminat-
ing.42 Therefore, the Boyd Court recognized a contents-based priv-
ilege against the compelled production of documents.4 3
The Boyd decision has faced a great deal of criticism and many
of the standards articulated in the case have since been over-
ruled.44  Although Boyd dealt with business documents, the
the privilege, or at least in his possession in a purely personal capacity." Id.; Hale v. Hen-
kel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (holding that Fifth Amendment right is personal and cannot be
asserted by corporation or collective entity).
Collective entities do not enjoy a Fifth Amendment privilege because the privilege is
purely personal. See McCoRMICK, supra note 5, § 128, at 311. Corporations and their custo-
dians have no Fifth Amendment protection because the self-incrimination privilege only
applies to individuals. Id. Representatives of these entities likewise have no protection be-
cause they are acting on behalf of the organization and there is no expectation of a personal
privacy interest within the group. Id.
39 See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing Justice William Brennan's
reasoning for continued application of contents-based privilege based on privacy rationale).
40 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 741 F. Supp. 1059, 1069 (S.D.N.Y.
1990). "To the extent that one's private papers reveal the contents of one's mind, there is no
defensible line to be drawn between extracting a confession from one's lips and doing the
same by subpoenaing the thoughts recorded in one's diary . . ." Id.; Alito, supra note 2, at
39. "[Boyd has] endured because its reasoning contained a kernel of truth... forcing an
individual to give up possession of these intimate writings may be psychologically compara-
ble to prying words from his lips." Id.
41 See In re Grand Jury, 741 F. Supp. at 1068. "Implicit in Boyd [is the reality] that one's
papers can be an extension of oneself ..... Id.; see also infra notes 61-62 and accompanying
text (examining Justice Brennan's rationale that papers are extension of one's mind).
42 See In re Grand Jury, 741 F. Supp. at 1069. The court stated:
If the Fifth Amendment is to stand for our constitutional preference for an accusatorial
system, it must protect the divulgence of the contents of one's mind, one's thought
processes, when those testimonial divulgences-be they oral or written communica-
tions-would self-incriminate .... [T]he interests of privacy, the desire to preserve the
autonomous functioning of the individual, and practical considerations outweigh the
need for incriminating evidence and support the retention of the privilege for private
papers.
Id.; see also infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan's fear
that limitation of Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege would hamper free
expression).
43 See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text (reviewing Supreme Court's application of
Boyd doctrine).
44 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (holding that, in proper circum-
stances, testimonial evidence may be seized and used as evidence); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 302-03 (1967) (holding that purely evidentiary, non-testimonial evidence may be
searched for and seized); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906) (limiting application of
Fourth Amendment to subpoenas).
Since Boyd, the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment applies only when
the individual is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating. See
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Supreme Court has overruled the application of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination to corporate entities.4 5
Although certain standards in Boyd have been overruled, the no-
tion that the contents of private papers are privileged has been
relied upon in subsequent Supreme Court cases. 46 In applying a
contents-based privilege, documents containing private informa-
tion, such as diaries and datebooks, would be protected from
disclosure.4 7
B. Fisher v. United States
In Fisher v. United States,41 the Supreme Court articulated a
new test for determining whether the compelled production of doc-
uments was self-incriminating.49 In Fisher, the attorneys for two
taxpayers received subpoenas from the Internal Revenue Service
directing them to produce certain workpapers, which were pre-
pared by the taxpayers' accountants.5" While the Fisher Court an-
alyzed several issues,51 the relevant issue was whether the tax-
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,265-67 (1967) (excluding handwriting exemplars as long
as they contain no testimonial or communicative evidence); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967) (excluding voice exemplars); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
763-64 (1966) (declining to extend Fifth Amendment protection to providing blood samples
while under arrest).
45 See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974) (holding that privilege against self-
incrimination does not apply to partnerships and corporations).
4 See Ballman v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186, 186 (1906) (holding that individual cannot be
compelled to produce personal cashbook which contains incriminating evidence); see also
supra note 8 and accompanying text (reviewing cases citing Boyd to protect private papers).
47 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 426-27 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). In
his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan stated:
A precise cataloguing of private papers within the ambit of the privacy protected by the
privilege is probably impossible. Some papers, however, do lend themselves to classifi-
cation. . . . Personal letters constitute an integral aspect of a person's private en-
clave .... Papers in the nature of a personal diary are a fortiori protected under the
privilege.
Id.; Alito, supra note 2, at 39. The author contends: "Certain intimate personal docu-
ments-a diary is the best example-are like an extension of the individual's mind. They
are a substitute for the perfect memory that humans lack." Id. (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at
420; Craig Bradley, Constitutional Protection for Private Papers, 16 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
461, 461 (1981); Gerstein, supra note 5, at 361).
48 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
49 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing art of production analysis for
business documents); see also infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text (discussing test
articulated in Fisher).
50 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 393-414 (analyzing facts and act of production test).
51 Id. at 393-414. The Court held that compelling the attorneys to produce the docu-
ments would not violate the taxpayers' Fifth Amendment rights because the taxpayers
would not be compelled to produce anything. Id. at 396-98. The Court decided that the
attorney-client privilege would not be violated by compelling the attorneys to produce the
documents. Id. at 396-401. The Court finally addressed the question of whether the act of
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payers were protected from producing the subpoenaed documents
pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.52
The Court declared that proper examination of Fifth Amend-
ment self-incrimination protection involved the question of
whether the act of producing the papers was compelled, testimo-
nial, and incriminating. 53 The Court held that since the docu-
ments were prepared by the accountants, and not the taxpayers
themselves, the preparation of the papers was not compelled.
54
The production of the documents may have been compelled, but
the preparation was not.55
The Court also stated that because the government already
knew of the existence and location of the documents, there was no
testimonial aspect to the production.56 Further, the Court held
that neither the fact that the documents existed, nor the fact that
the taxpayer possessed them, was incriminating.57 Because the
production of the documents was not compelled, testimonial, and
incriminating, the act of producing the subpoenaed documents did
not violate the Fifth Amendment.5 The Court expressly stated
that it was not examining whether the Fifth Amendment would
production would violate tihe taxpayers' Fifth Amendment rights and determined that it
would not. Id. at 402-14.
52 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 405-14 (analyzing history of contents-based privilege derived from
Boyd and proposing alternative approach based on act of production).
53 Id. at 409-10. The Supreme Court stated that "the preparation of all of the papers
sought in these cases was wholly voluntary, and they cannot be said to contain compelled
testimonial evidence . . . ." Id. at 409. Because the creation of the contents of the document
was not compelled, the Court reviewed whether the act of producing the documents was
compelled. Id. at 409-10. "The act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena never-
theless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers
produced." Id. at 410. The Court recognized to manners in which the act of complying with
the subpoena could violate the self-incrimination clause. Id. at 409-10. "Compliance with
the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or
control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are
those described in the subpoena." Id. at 410.
54 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409. "A subpoena served on a taxpayer requiring him to produce an
accountant's workpapers in his possession ... does not compel oral testimony; nor would it
ordinarily compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the contents of the
documents sought." Id.
55 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (explaining that while production of docu-
ments under subpoena would be compulsory, preparation of documents would not).
56 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (stating that government did not
need taxpayer to authenticate existence of tax documents).
57 Id. at 412. "[W]e are quite unprepared to hold that either the fact of existence of the
papers or of their possession by the taxpayer poses any realistic threat of incrimination to
the taxpayer." Id.
58 See id. at 410-14 (creating test for determining whether act of production would vio-
late Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause, but holding that facts in Fisher did not
allow taxpayers to invoke Fifth Amendment).
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have protected the taxpayer had the documents in question been
his own personal papers, rather than workpapers prepared by an
accountant.59
In a concurring opinion, Justice William Brennan explained
that the Fifth Amendment protected individuals from compelled
production of private papers.6 ° In determining that the Fifth
Amendment extended to private papers whether the act of creat-
ing them was compelled or not,61 Justice Brennan stated that
compelling a person to disclose the contents of his or her private
papers was analagous to compelling one to disclose the contents of
his or her mind.62 Although he approved of the act of production
analysis for business and nonpersonal documents,63 he argued on
historical grounds that the Court should not eliminate the con-
tents-based privilege in favor of the act of production privilege.64
Justice Brennan argued that the Fisher holding eroded the protec-
tion against self-incrimination contained in the Fifth Amend-
ment.65 Justice Brennan's rationale, as opposed to that espoused
by the majority, was more consistent with the historical back-
59 Id. at 414. "Whether the Fifth Amendment would shield the taxpayer from producing
his own tax records in his possession is a question not involved here; for the papers de-
manded here are not his 'private papers.'" Id.
60 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan would not join in
the majority's opinion because of its negative impact upon the privilege against compelled
production of private books and documents. Id.
61 See id. at 418-23 (1976) (examining history of self-incrimination privilege); see also
supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text (discussing history of privilege against self-
incrimination).
62 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 420 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated:
An individual's books and papers are generally little more than an extension of his
person... I perceive no principle which does not permit compelling one to disclose the
contents of one's mind but does permit compelling the disclosure of the contents of that
scrap of paper by compelling its production.
Id. Justice Brennan further stated that the ability to write one's private thoughts on paper
and to preserve memories in such a way would be impeded if those writings could be used
to incriminate the person who wrote them. Id. He stated that the historical purpose of the
privilege was to enable people to record their thoughts without fear. Id.
63 See id. at 414 (stating that Brennan agreed that contents of tax records in question
would not be protected by self-incrimination clause).
64 Id. at 414-415. "[Ilt is but another step in the denigration of privacy principles settled
nearly 100 years ago in Boyd v. United States .. . [Qince again the Court is laying the
groundwork for future decisions ... against the availability of the privilege." Id. If the
protections of the Fifth Amendment were diminished, Justice Brennan stated people would
be afraid to write their most personal thoughts on paper for fear that the contents would be
used against them. Id.
65 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 415. Justice Brennan stated that Court had interpreted the Fifth
Amendment as preventing governmental intrusions into one's privacy either through com-
pelled testimony or compelled production of one's private books or documents. Id.
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ground of the Fifth Amendment and the principles sought to be
preserved.
C. United States v. Doe
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Doe,66 reaffirmed Fisher
and continued to erode the validity of the contents-based privi-
lege." In Doe, the owner of several sole proprietorships was
served with a subpoena for the production of business records.
6 8
The defendant's motion to quash the subpoena was granted by the
district court and affirmed by the Third Circuit. 9 On certiorari,
the Supreme Court determined that the contents of the business
records were not privileged because the documents were prepared
voluntarily. 70 In Doe, as in Fisher, the Supreme Court did not ex-
pressly overrule the contents-based privilege established in Boyd,
but rather, applied the act of production analysis to nonpersonal
papers. 7 1
Although the Court held that the contents of the business docu-
ments were not privileged, the issue of whether personal papers
would have been protected was not before the court and, therefore,
not addressed. 72 Nevertheless, the Justices of the Court approved
66 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
67 Id. at 610. "The Court in Fisher expressly declined to reach the question of whether
the Fifth Amendment privilege protects the contents of an individual's tax records in his
possession. The rationale underlying our holding in that case is, however, persuasive here."
Id.; see also United States v. Doe, 1 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating Doe answered open
question in Fisher, that contents of personal papers not privileged), petition for cert. filed,
62 U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1993) (No. 93-523).
68 Doe, 465 U.S. at 606 (stating that respondent, owner of several sole proprietorships,
was served with number of supoenas to produce documents).
69 See id. at 607-08 (stating that respondent's motion to quash subpoenas granted by
district court for District of New Jersey and affirmed by Third Circuit).
70 Id. at 611-12. The Court stated that the respondent did not claim that the preparation
of the documents was compelled or that the subpoena would force him to authenticate the
documents. Id. Therefore, the contents of the documents were not privileged. Id.
71 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (stating that Fisher Court was not con-
cerned with question of private papers); see also infra note 72 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Justice Marshall's view that Doe did not overrule Boyd). But see infra note 72 and
accompanying text (analyzing Justice O'Connor's opinion that decision in Doe overruled
contents-based privilege).
72 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 619 (1984) (Marshall, J., concurring). According to
Justice Marshall:
Contrary to what Justice O'Connor contends .... I do not view the Court's opinion in
this case as having reconsidered whether the Fifth Amendment provides protection for
the contents of "private papers of any kind." This case presented nothing remotely
close to the question that Justice O'Connor eagerly poses and answers .... [Tihe docu-
ments at stake here are business records which implicate a lesser degree of concern for
privacy interests than, for example, personal diaries. ... Were it true that the Court's
opinion stands for the proposition that "the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no
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of the act of production analysis, but felt that there was still room
for a protection of private documents based on the historical con-
text of the Fifth Amendment.
III. CONFUSION AMONG THE CIRCUITS REGARDING THE
EXISTENCE OF THE CONTENTS-BASED PRVILEGE
A. The Circuits Which Do Not Recognize a Contents-Based
Privilege
As a result of the Supreme Court's emphasis on the act of pro-
duction privilege,73 some circuits have abandoned the traditional
contents-based privilege for the act of production analysis.7 4 The
Second,75 Fourth,76 Ninth,7 7 and District of Columbia 78 Circuits
have decided that the contents of voluntarily prepared documents
protection for the contents of private papers of any kind," I would assuredly dissent. I
continue to believe that under the Fifth Amendment "there are certain documents no
person ought to be compelled to produce at the Government's request."
Id. But see id. at 618. Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion in which she
announced that she considered the decision in Doe to effectively destroy any protection
which was afforded to the contents of documents, both private and nonprivate. Id.
73 See id. at 606-17 (Supreme Court followed Fisher's act of production analysis in pro-
tecting business papers of sole proprietor); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
397-414 (1976) (Supreme Court first articulated act of production privilege in Fisher, rea-
soning that act of producing documents in relation to subpoena may be compelling testi-
mony); Aftermath of Fisher, supra note 13, at 683. "[Flisher v. U.S. and other recent
Supreme Court decisions represent a fundamental shift in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence
from a concern with privacy to a focus on compulsion." Id.
74 See United States v. Doe, 1 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1993), petition for cert. filed, 62
U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1993) (No. 93-523). "In a series of decisions beginning with
Fisher v. United States ... the Court raised serious doubt as to the continued validity of
[Boyd's] pronouncement [of protecting private papers from compelled production]." Id.; see
also Kenneth J. Melilli, Note, Act of Production Immunity, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 238 (1991).
"Several decisions have read Fisher [and the Court's later opinion in Doe] as precluding the
contents of private business papers ... [as well as] ... the contents of voluntarily created,
personal, non-business papers." Id.
75 Doe, 1 F.3d at 88 (asserting Fifth Amendment does not protect contents of voluntarily
prepared, nonbusiness documents).
76 See United States v. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981, 983 (4th Cir. 1991) (contents of docu-
ments, including desk, pocket calendars, appointment books, planners are not privileged),
appeal after remand sub nom., United States v. Stone, 976 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1843 (1993); United States v. Lang, 792 F.2d 1235, 1238 (4th Cir. 1986)
(custodian of corporate records could not invoke Fifth Amendment privilege).
77 See United States v. Lacoste, 800 F.2d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 1986) (former police chief's
records subject to disclosure, without reaching question of contents of documents); United
States v. Terry, 759 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th Cir. 1985) (contents of documents, including per-
sonal journals, stock transactions, escrow statements, receipts are not privileged). But see
Lacoste, 800 F.2d at 984-87 (Poole, J., dissenting) (arguing that because Doe only dealt with
business documents, holding not applicable to personal non-business records).
78 In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 83, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (privilege "does not cover the con-
tents of any voluntarily prepared records including personal ones"), cert. denied sub nom.,
Roe v. United States, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990).
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are not protected by the Fifth Amendment.7 9 In rejecting the con-
tents-based privilege, these courts have exceeded the holdings in
Fisher and Doe because both of these decisions applied the act of
production privilege in the context of business documents and not
in the realm of personal papers.
Recently, the Second Circuit in United States v. Doe80 held that
the Fifth Amendment did not protect the contents of personal doc-
uments.8 ' Doe was subpoenaed to produce his pocket calendar in
connection with possible securities violations.8 2 The Second Cir-
cuit explained that since Boyd dealt with business records, the
Supreme Court's pronouncement concerning personal papers was
dicta.8 3 Therefore, it was not controlling with respect to personal
papers.8 4 In addition, the Second Circuit stated that after Fisher
and Doe, any existence of a contents-based privilege had disap-
79 See United States v. Doe, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that contents of volun-
tarily prepared documents not privileged, although act of production could be
incriminating).
80 Doe, 1 F.3d at 88-89. Doe was subpoenaed to produce the original version of a pocket
calendar-appointment book in connection with a SEC investigation of violations of the fed-
eral securities laws. Id. at 88. Doe, relying on Boyd, argued that the contents of the docu-
ment should prevent disclosure. Id. at 90-92. However, the Second Circuit ruled that the
Fifth Amendment did not protect the contents of voluntarily prepared non-business docu-
ments such as Doe's calendar. Id. at 92.
81 Id. at 93; see In re Proceeding Before the Grand Jury, 767 F.2d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1985).
This issue was not previously resolved by the Second Circuit. Id. "We do not reach the
question, left open in Fisher, of whether the Fifth Amendment protects the contents of
private papers that are not business documents." Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
Duces Tecum, 722 F.2d 981, 986 (2d Cir. 1983). Since Fisher and Doe's shift toward the act
of production privilege, no case involving purely personal papers before the court. Id.
"Thus, whatever the current scope of Body's protection-a question we do not reach to-
day-these papers do not come within its purview." Id.; United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32,
36 n.5 (2d Cir. 1983). The Second Circuit could decide the cases based on the act of produc-
tion privilege without having to reach the question of Boyd's validity. Id. "Because we hold
today that Fisher prohibits compelled production of the records if the act of production
would be incriminatory, we need not address the argument" that the subpoenaed records
are private papers and therefore privileged. Id.
82 Doe, 1 F.3d at 88-89.
83 See id. at 92 (stating contents-based privilege for personal papers was dicta in Boyd).
84 United States v. Doe, 1 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1993). "Boyd concerned business docu-
ments, and therefore its declarations regarding the Fifth Amendment's protection of non-
business documents were dicta." Id.; see Melilli, supra note 74, at 238. "The reliance upon
Boyd for a distinction governing the contents of private papers is questionable, for the doc-
ument at issue in Boyd was an invoice for shipped merchandise, which was hardly a pri-
vate paper." Id. Boyd's pronouncement regarding the protection of private papers, however,
has been repeated by the Supreme Court numerous times. See Doe, 1 F.3d at 95 (Altimari,
J., dissenting). Two years before Fisher, the Supreme Court stated: "It has long been estab-
lished, of course, that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as
well as compelled oral testimony." See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1974).
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peared.8 5 According to the court, the focus in Fisher and Doe was
on whether the act of producing the documents in question was
compelled testimonial communication, rather than on the nature
of the document.8 6 Lastly, the Second Circuit relied on the basis
that three other circuits had rejected the contents-based
privilege.8 7
Although this argument seems persuasive, it fails. For ninety
years, a contents-based privilege has been upheld. 8 Even though
Boyd's pronouncement protecting the contents of personal docu-
ments was dicta, it has been followed by the Supreme Court in
numerous opinions.8 9
The Second Circuit disregarded the contents-based privilege be-
cause it was dicta,90 and advanced the position that the act of pro-
duction analysis applied to all self-incrimination cases.9 How-
ever, this position was also dicta because Fisher and Doe dealt
with business documents. In effect, the Second Circuit chose to
substitute the dicta of one case for that of another.
The Second Circuit also rejected the contents-based privilege
because three other circuits abandoned that analysis.92 However,
this "follow the leader" argument is not as sound as the Second
Circuit believes it to be. The Supreme Court enunciated the con-
85 See Doe, 1 F.3d at 93. "The Court no longer views the Fifth Amendment as a general
protector of privacy or private information, but leaves that role to the Fourth Amendment."
Id.
86 Id. at 91-92.
87 Id. at 93; see also supra notes 73-95 and accompanying text (discussing circuits that
do not follow content-based privilege). While three other circuits have rejected the personal
document privilege, the Third and Fifth Circuits still hold that the Fifth Amendment pro-
tects personal papers. See infra notes 96-116 and accompanying text (discussing circuits
which adhere to content-based privilege). Other circuits that have not yet decided the issue
have "made statements that leave room for some kind of exception for personal papers." See
Doe, 1 F.3d at 95 (Altimari, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 117-126 and accompanying
text (discussing circuits which reserved judgment).
88 See Doe, 1 F.3d at 95 (Altimari, J., dissenting) (stating that Boyd's content-based priv-
ilege has been followed in numerous opinions); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text
(discussing Supreme Court decisions following Boyd).
89 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court decisions follow-
ing Boyd).
90 United States v. Doe, 1 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that Boyd's pronouncement
regarding personal papers was dicta).
91 Id. at 93 (holding that contents of voluntarily prepared documents were not privi-
leged, although act of production analysis may apply).
92 See id. (stating that three circuits held that Fifth Amendment does not protect con-
tents of any papers); see also supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text (discussing circuits
that abandoned contents-based privilege).
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tents-based privilege and never overruled it. 93 The fact that three
circuits believe the Supreme Court has overruled such an analysis
should not be dispositive and should not be the impetus for other
circuits to follow such an approach. This argument also neglects
to consider that the Third and Fifth Circuits continue to follow the
dicta in Boyd. 94 Lastly, the Second Circuit chose not to address
that some Supreme Court Justices believe the contents-based
privilege is still the law.95
B. The Circuits Which Recognize a Contents-Based Privilege
The Third96 and Fifth97 Circuits have not strayed from the con-
tents-based privilege formulated in Boyd.98 In United States v.
Davis9 9 and United States v. Van Artsdalen,'0 0 the Fifth and
Third Circuits, respectively, relied on a historical analysis of pri-
vacy interests to support the application of a contents-based privi-
93 See Doe, 1 F.3d at 95 (Altimari, J., dissenting) (stating that contents-based privilege
had not been expressly overruled nor had Supreme Court indicated to do so).
94 See infra notes 96-116 and accompanying text (discussing circuits that follow con-
tents-based approach).
95 See Doe, 1 F.3d at 95 (Altimari, J., dissenting) (stating that two Justices in Fisher
opined that Fifth Amendment protects contents of personal papers); see also Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 414-30 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that history
favors privacy rationale of contents-based privilege); Fisher, 425 U.S. at 431-32 (Marshall,
J., concurring) (stating that some documents should be protected from compulsion).
96 See In re Grand Jury, 680 F.2d 327, 333 (3d Cir. 1982) (private papers are privileged
because a purpose of Fifth Amendment is to ensure an individual's right to privacy); United
States v. Van Artsdalen, 632 F.2d 1033, 1042 (3rd Cir. 1980) (Fifth Amendment protects
accused from government-compelled disclosure of self-incriminating private papers, such
as purely personal date books).
97 United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1042 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862
(1981). "The Fifth Amendment creates a zone of privacy which absolutely protects docu-
ments in the hands of the owner." Id.; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162, 167 (5th
Cir. 1979). "Compelling production of an individual's books and papers to be used against
him in legal proceedings violates.., the Fifth Amendment." Id.
98 See In re Grand Jury, 680 F.2d at 333 (relying on Boyd and its progeny to determine
that one's right to privacy was purpose of Fifth Amendment protection); Davis, 636 F.2d at
1042. "[Boyd's zone of privacy was] the fountainhead of modern analysis of the self-incrimi-
nation clause." Id. "This court, however, has already rejected interpretations of Fisher and
Andresen that would either limit the Boyd principle to non-business records or abolish it
altogether." Id.
99 636 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981).
100 632 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1980).
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lege. 10 These courts noted that privacy interests played an impor-
tant role in protecting personal papers. 10
2
United States v. Van Artsdalen involved a subpoena for the de-
fendant's appointment book.10 3 The Third Circuit found the ap-
pointment book to be the defendant's personal papers, and thus,
privileged from disclosure.' 04 Relying on the Fisher Court's ex-
plicit efforts to distinguish Fisher from Boyd,'0 5 the Third Circuit
concluded that the contents-based privilege for private papers did
not lose its validity.0 6 The court also reasoned that the Fifth
Amendment protects privacy interests, and therefore, the defend-
ant had a right to expect privacy in regard to these documents. 107
The court feared that allowing disclosure of an individual's per-
sonal papers would prevent the writing of one's thought and
ideas,10  and ruled that an intrusion into the fundamental right to
express oneself would not be tolerated. 10 9
In United States v. Davis, an attorney was subpoenaed to pro-
duce records relating to his client's tax liability. 10 The Fifth Cir-
cuit held that many of the documents, including the client's will,
were protected under the attorney-client privilege."' To invoke
the attorney-client privilege, the documents in question must
have been privileged "in the hands of the client."112 Pursuant to a
contents-based analysis, the Fifth Circuit found these documents
101 See id. at 1042. The Third Circuit noted that the contents-based privilege is not
novel. Id. "It is a firmly embedded tenet of American constitutional law that the Fifth
Amendment absolutely protects an accused from having to produce, under government
compulsion, self-incriminating private papers." Id.; see also supra notes 18-29 and accom-
panying text (discussing history of Fifth Amendment and development of contents-based
privilege).
102 See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973) (privilege "respects a private
inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought"); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y.
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) ("right of each individual to a private enclave where he may
lead a private life"); see also supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (discussing privacy
and Fifth Amendment).
103 See Van Artsdalen, 632 F.2d at 1036-37.
104 Id. at 1044.
105 See id. at 1043 (discussing Fisher Court's leaving question of protection of personal
papers open); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976) (stating papers in
question were personal, therefore no ruling made on personal documents).
106 See Van Artsdalen, 632 F.2d at 1043 (concluding that Fisher's act of production anal-
ysis does not apply to private papers).
107 United States v. Van Artsdalen, 632 F.2d 1033, 1043-44.
108 Id. at 1043.
109 See id. at 1044 (suggesting that Boyd stands for rights of accused).
110 United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1032-34 (5th Cir. 1981).
111 Id. at 1044.
112 Id. at 1040-41.
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to be protected because of the personal nature of the records. 113
The court also noted that the act of production approach and the
contents-based analysis could coexist because the Supreme Court
in Fisher did not suggest otherwise. 1 4
Recognition of Fisher's act of production approach does not pre-
clude acceptance of a contents-based privilege. These two ap-
proaches are compatible. If the document in question is personal,
then its contents would prevent disclosure. 115 However, if the doc-
ument is business-related, then the act of production analysis
would apply." 6 This allows for the protection of privacy, which is
inherent in personal papers, while also adhering to the act of pro-
duction approach for business documents.
C. The Circuits Which Have Reserved Judgment
The First," 7 Sixth,1 18 Eighth, 1 9 and Eleventh 120 Circuits have
not decided whether the Fifth Amendment protects the contents of
personal papers. 12 1 These courts suggest that in some instances
personal papers may be privileged. 122 For example, the contents of
113 Id. at 1043.
114 See Davis, 636 F.2d at 1042. The Fifth Circuit has applied both the contents-based
privilege and the act of production privilege. Id. The court stated: "[tihese two branches of
Fifth Amendment analysis are not logically exclusive of each other. Nothing in Fisher sug-
gests otherwise ... ." Id.; see also Davis, supra note 4, at 130-31 (suggesting contents-based
privilege and act of production privilege co-exist).
115 See Davis, supra note 4, at 130 (suggesting that courts apply Boyd's content-based
approach to private papers); see also supra notes 96-114 and accompanying text (discussing
compatibility of two approaches).
116 See Davis, supra note 4, at 131 (suggesting that courts follow act of production analy-
sis for business documents).
117 See In re Steinberg, 837 F.2d 527, 530 (1st Cir. 1988) (notebooks subpoenaed in con-
nection with investigation of fraud during fund-raising activities were not intimate per-
sonal papers); In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 626 F.2d 1051, 1055 n.2 (1st Cir. 1980) (doc-
tor's appointment books no more personal than business records).
118 See Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir.) (contents of debtor's records relat-
ing to bankrupt estate were not intimately personal to require invoking Fifth Amendment
privilege, although act of production privilege could be utilized), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S.
925 (1985); United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1983) (taxpayer's
accounting workpapers do not have same degree of privacy as personal diary), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1099 (1984).
119 See United States v. Mason, 869 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir.) (subpoena of pocket calen-
dars not personal papers), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907 (1989).
120 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 921 F.2d 1184, 1186-87 (11th Cir. 1991) (sub-
poena of attorney's papers included both personal and business finances).
121 See id. at 1187 n.6 (Eleventh Circuit left open issue of validity of contents-based priv-
ilege without some ruling by Supreme Court); Grand Jury Proceeding, 626 F.2d at 1054 n.2
(since documents in question were business records, First Circuit did not have to rule on
validity of Boyd).
122 See United States v. Doe, 1 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 1993) (Altimari, J., dissenting).
"[A]lthough refusing to decide the matter, (they] have made statements that leave room for
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documents would be privileged where compelled disclosure would
"break the heart of our sense of privacy. " 12 3 The indecisiveness of
these circuits stemmed from the Supreme Court's failure to rule
on the validity of Boyd.'2 4 By rejecting the contents-based privi-
lege in the context of business documents, these courts have re-
served judgment until the Supreme Court mandates otherwise. 125
In effect, these courts, by narrowly drawing their holdings to the
context of business documents, have retained Boyd's contents-
based privilege for personal documents.
These courts should follow the Fifth Circuit's approach, which
allows for the mutual existence of the act of production privilege
and the contents-based privilege. The Fisher Court did not ex-
pressly state that the contents-based privilege was no longer
valid, rather the Justices explicitly stated that Fisher was not to
some kind of exception for personal papers." Id.; see also Schlansky, 709 F.2d at 1083.
"With respect to these less private papers [like a taxpayer's records] a majority of the
Supreme Court appears to agree that the Fifth Amendment does not absolutely bar their
compelled production." Id. However, it is suggested that "the 'privacies of life' which are
beyond the pale of legitimate government intrusion" are still protected. Id.
123 See Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1985). The Sixth Circuit stated:
Although we do not read either of these cases (Fisher and Doe) as holding that the
contents of private papers are never privileged, it is evident from the dialogue between
Justice Marshall and Justice O'Connor, in their concurring opinions in Doe, that if
contents are protected at all, it is only in rare situations, where compelled disclosure
would break the heart of our sense of privacy.
Id.; see also Mason, 869 F.2d at 416 (compelled disclosure would break "the heart of our
sense of privacy"); In re Steinberg, 837 F.2d 527, 530 (1st Cir. 1988). In this case, records
relating to bankrupt estate, a pocket calendar, and notebooks were not deemed personal
papers. Id. Therefore compelled disclosure would not intrude into one's privacy. Id.
124 See Grand Jury Investigation, 921 F.2d at 1187 n.6. The court stated:
We recognize that Andresen and later cases represent a shift in Fifth Amendment ju-
risprudence from privacy based rationale of Boyd, to the idea that records voluntarily
committed... to writing are not compelled testimony. However, although a few cir-
cuits have held that even personal papers are subject to this new rationale, this circuit
has not yet addressed the remaining vitality of Boyd with regard to personal docu-
ments. The Supreme Court's own reluctance to overrule Boyd and the government's
failure to press this point here counsel in favor of continuing to leave this question
open in this circuit.
Id.
125 See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text (discussing circuits which have re-
served judgment). In Fisher, the Supreme Court refused to extend the contents-based privi-
lege to the contents of an accountant's workpapers. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 414 (1976). In Doe, the Court held that the contents of business records of a sole pro-
prietor were not protected. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 (1984). Although,
these cases have "stripped the content of business records of any Fifth Amendment protec-
tion," they have not ruled on the application to personal papers. See In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 626 F.2d 1051, 1055 (1st Cir. 1980). The First Circuit stated: "We wish to empha-
size that this case does not involve subpoena of papers more intimate or personal than
business records. The applicability of Fisher v. United States to non-business, intimate per-
sonal papers such as private diaries or drafts of letters or essays is an open question." Id. at
1054 n.2.
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be interpreted as overruling Boyd.126 The Supreme Court merely
articulated an alternative analysis for Fifth Amendment protec-
tion which was entirely consistent with the contents-based privi-
lege. Therefore to apply the act of production analysis to all situa-
tions would be inconsistent with current Supreme Court
precedence.
IV. THE NEW YORK APPROACH
New York courts recognize both the contents-based privilege 127
and the act of production privilege. 12 ' The New York Court of Ap-
peals, in In re Vanderbilt,129 found that a tape cassette containing
a suicide message was privileged based on the nature of the evi-
dence, and because the act of producing the tape was a testimonial
communication.130 New York courts are aware of the distinction
between personal papers and business documents, 13 1 and there-
fore, utilize different approaches depending on the nature of the
document. 3 2 If the document is personal, it is protected from dis-
closure under the contents-based approach. 33 By contrast, if the
126 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414 (leaving open question of validity of contents-based
privilege).
127 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886) (protected contents of individ-
ual's privately held papers).
128 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (act of producing subpoenaed documents may have in-
criminating testimonial communication).
129 57 N.Y.2d 66, 439 N.E.2d 378, 453 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1982).
130 Id. at 79, 439 N.E.2d at 385, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 670. "A tape cassette is clearly testimo-
nial in that it is an aural record of the accused's communication; only live testimony could
be any more personal. Moreover production of the tape.., would be testimonial by virtue of
his authentication." Id.
131 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Bekins Record Storage Co., 62 N.Y.2d
324, 328, 465 N.E.2d 345, 347, 476 N.Y.S.2d 806, 808 (1984). "The Supreme Court has
recently ruled that this right does not extend to the contents of business papers that were
not created under government compulsion. Of course, we are bound by that interpretation
and, hence, petitioners' Fifth Amendment claim must fail." Id. The New York Court of Ap-
peals' opinion reflects the personal-business dichotomy. Id. Their discussion classified the
documents as business. Id. Since these documents were not personal, there could be no
contents-based privilege. Id. However, there could be an act of production privilege. Id.; see
also People v. Doe, 90 A.D.2d 669, 455 N.Y.S.2d 866 (4th Dep't 1982) (contents of medical
records in possession of doctors not privileged), affd, 59 N.Y.2d 655, 450 N.E.2d 211, 463
N.Y.S.2d 405 (1983).
132 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served Upon John Doe, 126 Misc. 2d
1010, 1013, 484 N.Y.S.2d 759, 762 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1984). The court viewed
Fisher's shift toward the act of production privilege as applying to business records and not
personal property. Id. The court stated: "in recent years, the protection of one's business
papers has been interpreted to mean not a general protection of privacy." Id. Fisher's act of
production analysis would apply for business documents while personal papers would be
privileged because of their private content. Id.
133 See Doe, 90 A.D.2d at 669, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 866. "The papers and effects which the
privilege protects, however, must be the private property of the person claiming the privi-
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document is business-oriented, the act of production analysis is
applied.13 4 Such an approach should be followed by all courts until
the Supreme Court rules otherwise.
For example, in In re Grand Jury Subpoena,135 a sole proprietor
of a consulting firm was subpoenaed to produce his company's
business documents. 13  The New York Supreme Court, Queens
County, addressed the personal papers-business documents
dichotomy.' 3 v In dividing its discussion along theses lines, the
court stated that a person's private papers were protected because
of their contents.1 38 However, the contents of voluntarily prepared
business documents would not be privileged by the Fifth
Amendment. 13
9
New York Courts have not viewed Fisher and Doe as overruling
Boyd, 140 but rather, viewed the contents-based privilege and the
act of production privilege as mutually inclusive. 41 The New York
view, like the Fifth Circuit's, is the better approach. This ap-
proach examines the nature of the documents to determine which
analysis, the act of production or contents-based, should apply.
42
This rationale retains the privacy notions prevalent in American
society, which have not been expressly undermined by the
Supreme Court.
lege, or at least in his possession in a purely personal capacity." Id.; see also People v.
Cappetta, 89 Misc. 2d 937, 938, 392 N.Y.S.2d 992, 993 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1977). "It
has long been established that the Fifth Amendment protects against compulsory self-in-
crimination and that this protection extends to... personal documents concerning more
intimate information about an individual's private life." Id.
134 See Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 126 Misc. 2d at 1012, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 762
(sole proprietor's business records would be privileged if act of production had incriminat-
ing effect); People v. Miller, 108 Misc. 2d 528, 530, 437 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (Nassau County
Ct. 1981). "The Fifth Amendment does not.., protect the 'content' of personal business
records .... But the compelled production of personally kept and maintained business
records may result in a testimonial act of authentication which is protected by the Fifth
Amendment privilege." Id.
135 126 Misc. 2d 1010, 484 N.Y.S.2d 759 (Sup Ct. Queens County 1984).
136 Id. at 1010-11, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
137 Id. at 1013, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
138 Id. "Such [Fifth Amendment] protection has been extended to one's own papers since
these reflect a 'private inner sanctum of individual feeling[s] and thought[s].'" Id. (quoting
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973)).
139 Grand Jury Subpoena, 126 Misc. 2d at 1012, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
140 See supra notes 127-39 and accompanying text (discussing New York's approach).
141 See Davis, supra note 4, at 131-32. "The Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Doe is better characterized as indecision. Disagreement between the Justices has led the
Court to resort to a vagueness of language which perhaps quite intentionally permits a
variety of interpretations of the law." Id.; see also supra notes 98-116 and accompanying
text (discussing compatibility of two approaches).
142 See Davis, supra note 4, at 130-31 (suggesting contents-based and act of production
approaches are compatible).
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CONCLUSION
Without the protection of personal documents provided by the
Supreme Court in Boyd, individuals may be compelled to disclose
the contents of private papers, such as diaries and letters. The
innermost thoughts of a person, written on paper, should not be
viewed as any less prejudicial than the oral testimony of the per-
son on the witness stand. Some courts have interpreted recent
Supreme Court decisions as rejecting a contents-based privilege.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not explicitly overruled the
contents-based privilege. The circuits should apply both the con-
tents-based approach and the act of production approach until the
Supreme Court mandates otherwise. With the confusion among
the lower courts, the Supreme Court must offer guidance by reaf-
firming the Boyd doctrine protecting private papers. The time has
come for the Supreme Court to take an affirmative stance on this
issue.
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